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The Scope and Limitations of the Implied Warranty
on Federal Government Design Specifications
INTRODUCTION
This article will focus on the scope and limitations of the im-
plied warranty that originates when a contractor uses government
design specifications to perform a government contract. The
scope of the implied warranty is very broad, covering the suitabil-
ity of the finished product, method and timeliness of manufacture,
and the accuracy of the specifications. Limitations on the implied
warranty include caveatory or disclaimer provisions included in
the contract, the contractor's unjustifiable reliance on the specifi-
cations, the necessity of showing commercial impracticability, the
contractor's authorship of the specifications, and the authoriza-
tion to undertake alternative methods of performance.
Frequently, the inadequacy of a government design specifica-
tion is not apparent and this fact can be determined only after
some or all of the work has been performed on the contract. At
common law, the implied warranty rule was developed to protect
the contractor from unanticipated obligations imposed by the con-
tract. Stated in another way, if the contractor performed in ac-
cordance with the specifications, he was deemed to have met his
contractual obligations. Thus, any additional costs resulting from
the defective specifications were recoverable.
SCOPE OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
A. Suitability of the Finished Product
1. The Government's Duty of Due Care
The common law implied warranty rule was incorporated into
government contracts law by United States v. Spearin.1 In
Spearin, the plaintiff contracted with the government to construct
a drydock in conformity with plans and specifications supplied by
the government. The plans and specifications called for the relo-
cation of a sewer, which plaintiff completed and which was ac-
cepted by the government. About a year after its relocation, the
1. 248 U.S. 132 (1918).
sewer burst, flooding the drydock. Plaintiff promptly notified the
government of his unwillingness to rebuild the sewer and finish
the rest of the construction unless the government promised to
pay for the damages incurred and also agreed to assume responsi-
bility for future damages. Insisting that it was plaintiff's responsi-
bility to remedy the existing conditions, the government
terminated the contract and took possession of the plant and
materials at the worksite. Plaintiff then sued for breach of con-
tract.
In allowing plaintiff's claim, the Court applied the common law
rule which placed responsibility on the government for the conse-
quences of defects in government-prepared specifications which
the contractor was required to follow. There is an implied, war-
ranty that if the specifications are followed, a suitable finished
product will be produced.2 This implied warranty is based on the
presumed expertise of the government and cannot be obviated by
general clauses in the contract requiring the contractor to inspect
the site, study the specifications or assume responsibility for the
work until completion and acceptance. 3
These specifications, however, do not have to be perfect. The
government is allowed a reasonable number of errors as long as
the specifications have been prepared with reasonable care and
are of average quality as judged by industry practices. This rule
was stated in John McShain, Inc. v. United States:
Although Government-furnished plans need not be perfect, they must be
adequate for the task or "reasonably accurate." Here, the defendent, in its
haste to meet a fiscal year deadline, failed to have the drawings prepared
with ordinary care, and they were issued before necessary checking was
accomplished. Such "failure to be reasonably careful in the preparation of
the plans" is basis for a breach claim. The evidence clearly demonstrates
that the drawings and addenda originally provided by the defendant were
not sufficiently legible or coordinated to permit satisfactory construction
of the desired building. Thus, defendant is liable for breach of warranty in
2. Id. at 135.
3. Id. at 137. The government inserted three general exculpatory clauses in
the contract with Spearin:
"271. Examination of site.-Intending bidders are expected to examine
the site of the proposed dry-dock and inform themselves thoroughly of the
actual conditions and requirements before submitting proposals."
"25. Checking plans and dimensions; lines and levels.-The contractor
shall check all plans furnished him immediately upon their receipt and
promptly notify the civil engineer in charge of any discrepancies discov-
ered therein .... The contractor will be held responsible for the lines
and levels of his work, and he must combine all materials properly, so that
the completed structure shall conform to the true intent and meaning of
the plans and specifications."
"21. Contractor's responsibility-The contractor shall be responsible for
the entire work and every part thereof, until completion and final accept-
ance by the Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks, and for all tools, appli-
ances, and property of every description used in connection
therewith ......
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the furnishing to plaintiff of defective drawings.
4
The standard of reasonableness is tested by the end result. If
the specifications are followed but the end result is an unsuitable
or unusable product, the government will have breached its duty
of reasonable care. For example, in R.E.D.M. Corporation v.
United States,5 the court, in awarding damages to a contractor
who was unable to attain the contract's mass production goals by
using government specifications, stated:
In light of the singularly contrary purport of all of its factual determina-
tions relevant to the problem of arming, it was plain error for the Board to
refuse to acknowledge, simply because plaintiff experienced less than to-
tal arming test failure, that the contract drawings were defective in ex-
pressly authorizing too broad a range of leaf metal thickness to insure
proper arming of the completed fuze assemblies.
The fact that tolerance specifications yield some acceptable finished arti-
cles clearly does not mean that they may not be deemed defective for pur-
poses of the author's liability to the user. In Ithaca Gun Co. v. United
States, the court did not hesitate to declare tolerance specifications for
machine gun subassemblies defective even though some of the compo-
nents that were manufactured according to those specifications fit to-
gether satisfactorily. In awarding the manufacturer reimbursement of
additional costs incurred in attempting to achieve satisfactory results by
following the Government's original specifications, the court expressed
the liability standard applicable to tolerance specifications included in
Government contracts as follows. Unless some reason therefor is indi-
cated, contractors normally are not required, prior to bidding, to under-
take an expensive and time-consuming "tolerance check" with respect to
every possible permitted dimension of every component simply to verify
the accuracy of the Government's drawings and their suitability for the
production of a properly functioning end item. Contractors are ordinarily
entitled to assume that parts manufactured in compliance with the pre-
scribed dimensions and permitted tolerances, even the extremes thereof,
will, when joined, properly function.6
The government may breach the implied warranty of suitability
of the finished product by omitting vital information from the
specifications. Such an omission may entitle the contractor to
damages on the theory that it is equivalent to a positive state-
ment by the government of the non-existence of certain facts. In
Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline Company v. Williams-McWilliams
Company7 the contractor, while dredging a bay under a govern-
ment contract, damaged a natural gas pipeline belonging to a
third party, who then brought suit against the contractor. The
contractor contended that the government should be held respon-
4. 412 F.2d 1281, 1283 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
5. 428 F.2d 1304, 1309 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
6. Id. at 1308.
7. 551 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1977).
sible for the accident because the government specifications did
not indicate the existence of any pipelines. The court agreed,
stating this omission amounted to a positive statement of their
non-existence. Thus, the absence of depiction is just as much an
item of information upon which the contractor may rely as depic-
tion would be, given a prolonged course of conduct justifying con-
tractor reliance on the government providing this information one
way or the other in specification drawings. 8 In such cases, the
contractor is entitled to rely on the government specifications,
and it is not incumbent on him to make an independent investiga-
tion into their accuracy.9
2. Duration of the Implied Warranty and Standing to Sue
Thereunder
Although Spearin represented the initial attempt to define the
scope of the implied warranty of suitability, questions concerning
the duration of the implied warranty of suitability and standing to
sue thereunder were not resolved in that case. In Poorvu v.
United States'o the Post Office Department obtained an assigna-
ble option to purchase certain land on which the construction of a
new post office facility was planned. The POD then hired an ar-
chitect to design and supervise the project. The architect's survey
of the area showed that, due to soft subsurface conditions, pilings
would be needed both under the building and in the parking and
truck maneuvering areas. Because the cost estimates were exces-
sive, pilings in the outside areas were eliminated from the specifi-
cations. Thereafter, the POD entered into a contract with one
Forman under which he agreed to take over the POD's option to
purchase the land, construct the post office facility in accordance
with the specifications prepared by the architect, and then lease
back the property to the POD. Three years later, Forman con-
veyed the property and assigned the lease to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
experienced no difficulty in the management of the property until
breaks in the waterline to the building were discovered. These
breaks caused the building to settle. Had construction proceeded
in the manner originally proposed by the architect, the extensive
8. Id. at 951.
9. In Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U.S. 165, 172 (1914) the Court held that
positive statements in the specifications that the dam which the contractor was
scheduled to repair was backed with broken stone, sawdust, and sediment re-
lieved the contractor from the responsibility of investigating the dam site to deter-
mine the character of the filling behind the dam and the accuracy of the
specifications. See also Mountain Home Contractors v. United States, 425 F.2d
1260, 1264 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Maurice Mandel, Inc. v. United States, 242 F.2d 1252, 1255-
56 (8th Cir. 1970).
10. 420 F.2d 993 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
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damage to the building would not have occurred. Plaintiffs, claim-
ing that the POD breached the implied warranty of suitability,
sued for the damages inflicted on the building.
Two of the issues confronting the court were whether or not the
case was controlled by Spearin due to the fact the damage oc-
curred not during construction but several years later, and sec-
ondly whether plaintiffs, as assignees, had standing to sue. As to
the first issue, the court held that the time when the defects in
the specifications first appeared was unimportant:
It would make little sense to impose the obligation of an implied warranty
and then limit the life of the warranty to the period of construction. It is
an implied warranty that the plans, if followed, will result in a properly
constructed building; not merely a warranty that the contractor will be
able to build a building within a given time period for a certain price. 11
As to the second issue, the court held that the plaintiffs, as assign-
ees, had standing to sue, citing the Restatement of the Law of
Contracts and noting that the Anti-Assignment Act was inapplica-
ble.12
3. Interagency Liability for the Implied Warranty
Generally, an independent federal agency will not be charged
with another federal agency's contractual responsibilities.13 In ef-
fect, this means that a contractor will find it difficult to try to hold
one agency responsible for the implied warranty created by an-
other. The contractor may succeed, however, if he can prove the
existence of an inter-agency relationship, involving a meaningful
link between the agencies. 14 Once an inter-agency relationship
exists, there is a mutual duty of disclosure. 15 The first agency
must indicate to the second agency that it may be responsible for
the implied warranty, although the second agency's actual knowl-
edge on this matter is not controlling.16 The key factor in uphold-
ing the implied warranty against the second agency is
establishing that the contractor reasonably believed that the sec-
ond agency was aware of it. 17 In L. W Foster Sportswear Co., Inc.
11. Id. at 1000.
12. Id. at 1001-03.
13. J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. United States, 390 F.2d 886, 891 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
14. L.W. Foster Sportswear Co., Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1285, 1291 (Ct.
Cl. 1969).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
v. United States,18 plaintiff, from 1949 to 1956, successfully
manufactured flying jackets from the Navy under a series of con-
tracts. The Navy permitted plaintiff to deviate from the specifica-
tions, which were defective, so that the contracts could be
performed. In 1956 the Army assumed responsibility for purchas-
ing the jackets and, subsequently, insisted on strict compliance
with the defective specifications. Plaintiff then requested reim-
bursement for the additional costs incurred. The Army argued
that plaintiff assumed the risk because it knew from the previous
contracts that acceptable flying jackets could not be made by ad-
hering to the specifications. The court, however, stated that since
the Navy waived adherence to the specifications on the previous
contracts, plaintiff, with justification, did not expect that it would
ever have to perform using the original specifications and, there-
fore, did not assume the risk.19 The court concluded that, even
though there had been a formal change in the procuring agencies,
the inter-agency relationship between the Navy and the Army
made it reasonable for plaintiff to believe that the Army would
continue the Navy's policies respecting the manufacture of the
flying jackets.20 Accordingly, the Army also impliedly warranted
the adequacy of the specifications.
The outcome may be different if the government's waiver is less
than absolute or if it is only a partial waiver.2 1 The implied war-
ranty of suitability may be destroyed if the government has been
inconsistent in granting waivers or if the contractor has been
warned that waivers will be granted only for certain aspects of the
contract.22
4. Hybrid Design and Performance Specifications
There are several varieties of specifications. Design specifica-
tions generally include information about measurements, toler-
ances, materials, in process and finished product testing, quality
control, and inspection procedures. Performance specifications
state the performance characteristics desired for the item or
items to be manufactured, but are silent about the manner in
which this is to be accomplished. With regard to performance
18. Id.
19. Id. Even if the specifications are free from defects, the contractor's reason-
able belief as to the waiver of performance under the specifications is grounds for
relief when the government later ends its silence on the matter and asks the con-
tractor to follow the specifications. Gresham and Company, Inc. v. United States,
470 F.2d 542, 554 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
20. 405 F.2d at 1291.
21. Doyle Shirt Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 462 F.2d 1150, 1154 (Ct.
Cl. 1972).
22. Id.
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specifications, implied warranty of suitability does not attach.23
There is considerable difficulty, however, in the fact that many
specifications combine both design and performance features. If
the contractor complies with government-supplied design specifi-
cations, but is unable to meet performance requirements, is he
nevertheless entitled to relief? This issue, although not addressed
in the Spearin case, was settled by subsequent cases. In Hol-Gar
Manufacturing Corporation v. United States,24 the government
drafted specifications for the manufacture of generator sets. The
specifications established definite size and weight limitations, set
forth environmental restrictions, and also designated that the sets
be operable twenty-three hours a day for six months with only
normal maintenance. Several years later, upon discovering that
the desired performance requirements could not be met, the gov-
ernment changed the specifications. This change allowed the con-
tractor to complete the contract. It was held that the contractor
was entitled to recover the additional money that was spent in
trying to follow the defective specifications, irrespective of its per-
formance aspects.25
This principle is afortiori applied when the government itself
questions the adequacy of its own specifications. 2 6 This may oc-
cur when the contracting officer employs an expert to study the
feasibility of achieving performance requirements and the ex-
pert's report on this subject is unfavorable. 27
If the information contained in the design specifications is frag-
mentary, the contractor may be liable for failing to achieve per-
23. See, e.g., John Thomson Press and Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 57
Ct. Cl. 200, 209 (1922). In that case, the contract required that the projectiles man-
ufactured satisfy standards established by the government inspectors. After the
government rejected the projectiles manufactured by plaintiff as not conforming to
the specifications, the court upheld the government's rejection and stated that
there was no liability on the part of the government to pay for the rejected projec-
tiles because the government did not indicate the method of manufacture. The
court observed that "it was for the plaintiff to meet these requirements of the
specifications as it saw fit."
The government may not be absolved of liability, however, if it breaches an in-
dependent duty to disclose information or if the performance specification embod-
ies a material misrepresentation which causes the contractor to be misled. Helene
Curtis Industries, Inc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 774, 778 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
24. 360 F.2d 634 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
25. Id. at 638.
26. Southwest Welding and Manufacturing Company v. United States, 413 F.2d
1167, 1175 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
27. Id.
formance requirements. In Penguin Industries, Inc. v. United
States,28 plaintiff contracted to supply the government with igni-
tion cartridges, however, the specifications did not describe the
amount of glue to be used or the points to which the glue was to
be applied in the manufacturing process. Because the specifica-
tions offered no guidance, plaintiff devised and used its own glu-
ing method. After plaintiff refused to replace the defective
ignition cartridges that were made by using its own gluing
method, the government partially terminated the contract. The
court upheld the government's action, stating that the specifica-
tions were more performance than design oriented:
While detailed specifications for the cartridges were provided, the specifi-
cations did not spell out in detail the manufacturing processes by which
the cartridges were to be fabricated. It was left to the contractor to use its
own judgment, experience and know-how in determining how to manufac-
ture certain aspects of the cartridge. Thus plaintiff construes the contract
too narrowly when it contends that it had only to meet the specifications
set out in the contract. The fact is it had to go beyond those specifications
as, for example, in the case of devising a method of gluing the flash tube to
the disk. As to this limited aspect, the contract was more like a "perform-
ance" contract than a "design" specification and, as in a performance con-
tract, the contractor must assume responsibility for the means and
methods selected to achieve the end result. In short, it had the obligation
to adopt and use a process of gluing that would achieve, in a workmanlike
manner, a functional cartridge.
2 9
The result is that the courts will look to the predominant intent
of the parties before classifying the specification as design, design
with performance aspects, or pure performance. 0 To aid the
courts in classifying the specification, there is a general presump-
tion that it is a design specification.3 1
5. Suitability of Government-Furnished Property
Closely related to the issue of the suitability of the finished
product is the suitability of the government-furnished property
used to make the finished product. A novel case of impression on
this subject was Topkis Brothers Company v. United States.32 In
that case, a contract for the manufacture of field jackets provided
that the government would be the exclusive supplier of the cloth
to be used and that the cloth would be of a type which was "suita-
ble for use." Soon after receiving the first cloth shipment, plaintiff
began production in the manner described in the specifications.
Although the cloth conformed to the specifications, its stiffness
made it very difficult for plaintiff to perform the contract. Cloth
28. 530 F.2d 934 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
29. Id. at 937.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 297 F.2d 536 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
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fracture, needle burning, thread breakage, and malformed stitch-
ing were some of the difficulties hindering plaintiff's performance.
As a result of these difficulties, plaintiff was forced to repair the
jackets which required a slow-down in the operation of plaintiffs
machinery and increased plaintiff's overhead expenses. In oppos-
ing plaintiff's claim for additional compensation, the government
took the position that since the cloth conformed to the specifica-
tions, the "suitable for use" clause meant only that the jackets
could be manufactured from the cloth. In a sharp break with ear-
lier precedents, the court rejected the government's position, stat-
ing that it was too restrictive, and held that the "suitable for use"
clause did not mean merely that the cloth conformed to the
specifications and that the jackets could be manufactured from
the cloth. Rather, the court interpreted the clause to mean that it
was suitable for use in the process of manufacturing the jackets:
Suitability, taken in context, does not mean merely that the end product
can be manufactured from the cloth, but rather refers to the cloth as it is
cut and sewn upon in the process of manufacturing the end product. The
cloth itself must be suitable from a mass production manufacturing stand-
point, taking into consideration the background of price and delivery
schedules.
The fallacy in defendant's interpretation of "suitable for use" may be illus-
trated by carrying it to its logical conclusion. Thus, in this case plaintiff
agreed to manufacture 1,000,000 jackets from specification cloth to be fur-
nished by defendant. There is no doubt that the cloth so furnished met
the technical wording of the specifications and that it could be, and was,
used to fabricate specification jackets. However, if the condition of the
cloth was nevertheless such that the jackets could not be made on a mass
production basis at all, but had to be hand-sewn individually, plaintiff
would not be entitled to increased costs of production under the theory
defendant urges upon us. This is so because the cloth would obviously be
specification cloth from which specification jackets could be manufac-
tured, albeit at an unreasonable expenditure of time and money. It can
hardly be said that the parties contemplated such a result would follow
from the "suitable for use" clause at the time they entered into the con-
tracts.
3 3
The rule in Topkis Brothers has no' application to a situation
where the government-furnished property is suitable for the pur-
pose for which it has been furnished.3 4 Also, if the government is
not obligated by contract to furnish any materials as, for example,
where the contract only describes the condition of the existing
materials, the government will not be liable if it becomes more
33. Id. at 541.
34. Preuss v. United States, 412 F.2d 1293, 1301 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
costly for the contractor to perform the contract.35
B. Adequacy of the Method of Production
End product specifications signify that the government is rely-
ing completely on the contractor's technical and manufacturing
skills to produce the item or items as contracted. If the govern-
ment decides not to surrender control over production, it will
specify the production methods to be followed. The contractor
who complies with the defective specifications may obtain com-
pensation on a breach of implied warranty of suitability theory36
as enunciated in Spearin. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. United
States37 extended the Spearin rule to cover methods of produc-
tion. Thus, if a different and more expensive method of produc-
tion is necessitated, the contractor will be entitled to recover
additional expenses. The contract in Helene Curtis involved the
production of a new disinfectant to be used by troops in the field
during the Korean War. Although the government developed the
disinfectant several years before hostilities broke out, it had
never been mass produced. The specifications listed the ingredi-
ents required to mass produce the disinfectant. The government
knew that the ingredients would have to be subjected to an ex-
pensive grinding process, but this information was omitted from
the specifications. In seeking to recover additional costs stem-
ming from the use of grinding equipment, the contractor stated
that the specifications were actively misleading as to the methods
of producing the disinfectant. The government argued that it was
not obligated to tell the contractor what methods to use but the
court disagreed, noting that the disinfectant was new, the govern-
ment sponsored its research and development, and the govern-
ment was aware of the contractor's ignorance.3 8 The court stated
that the government breached a duty of full disclosure. 39 For sim-
ilar reasons, the court also held that the specifications were mis-
leading with respect to grinding:
This was not merely a specification for an end-product, without any impli-
cations at all as to the method of manufacture. The reasonable bidders it
erroneously implied, in its context, the grinding would not be necessary to
make the desired item; and in the circumstances defendant should have
known that this would be the inference. Specifications so susceptible of a
misleading reading (or implication) subject the defendant to answer to a
contractor who has actually been misled to his injury.4 0
35. Win. A. Smith Contracting Company, Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1325,
1341 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
36. United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918).
37. 312 F.2d 774 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
38. Id. at 778.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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C. Timeliness of Performance
The Spearin rule was extended to other areas in cases subse-
quent to Helene Curtis. The government's failure to draft ade-
quate specifications generally will result in a breach of the
implied warranty that the contractor will be able to perform the
contract in the specified time period, if use of the inadequate
specifications delays completion. 41 The contractor is not required
to prove that the delay was unreasonable, since any delay caused
by the use of inadequate government specifications is per se un-
reasonable and hence compensable. 4 2 If the subcontractors suffer
an equivalent delay and thereafter attempt to hold the contractor
liable, the contractor is entitled to additional compensation. 43 The
government may also breach this implied warranty by being dila-
tory in recognizing the defect and revising the specifications to
prevent a delay.44
A breach of the implied warranty of timeliness of performance
cannot be cured by the government's decision to grant the con-
tractor an extension of time or to refrain from enforcing a liqui-
dated damages provision.45 The government will be relieved of
liability, however, if the delay was caused by the contractor's
inefficiency or factors outside the government's control.46 Fur-
ther, even if the specifications are inadequate, unless the
cumulative effect of the errors is unreasonable, the government
will not be liable for the contractor's losses.47
The question as to what is an unreasonable error has proven to
be troublesome. In Jefferson Construction Company v. United
States,48 plaintiff was awarded a contract to construct two rein-
forced concrete buildings, a retaining wall, and a pumphouse at a
41. Laburnum Construction Corporation v. United States, 325 F.2d 451, 457 (Ct.
Cl. 1963).
42. Chaney and James Construction Company, Inc. v. United States, 421 F.2d
728, 731 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
43. Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc. v. United States, 397 F.2d 826, 852 (Ct.
Cl. 1968); Blount Brothers Construction Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 962, 965 (Ct.
Cl. 1965).
44. Luria Brothers and Company, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.2d 701, 708 (Ct.
Cl. 1966).
45. J.D. Hedin Construction Company, Inc. v. United States, 347 F.2d 235, 241
(Ct. Cl. 1965).
46. United States v. Howard P. Foley Co., Inc., 329 U.S. 64, 68 (1946).
47. Wunderlich Contracting Company v. United States, 351 F.2d 956, 964 (Ct.
Cl. 1965).
48. 392 F.2d 1006 (Ct. Cl. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 914 (1967).
government research center. Before construction could begin,
plaintiff had to excavate soil at the site until bedrock was reached.
Plaintiff excavated to the depth indicated on the government
specifications but did not reach bedrock. Plaintiff then made
deeper excavations, which required additional time, manpower,
and special equipment, and sought compensation for a seventy
day delay. The court rejected plaintiff's claim, stating that al-
though the specifications were defective, in the absence of proof
that the government was negligent, plaintiff was not entitled to
delay damages. Thus, for an error to be unreasonable, the govern-
ment has to be negligent. 49
In so ruling, the court considered several factors which might
lead to a conclusion that the government had acted negligently. If
the delay has been caused by unforeseen conditions, the govern-
ment may not have acted negligently.50 However, if the govern-
ment has failed to observe reasonable industry standards of
accuracy in preparing the specifications, the opposite may be
true.51
Other court opinions have declined to follow the negligence
standard established in Jefferson Construction Company. Rather,
a strict liability standard has been formulated. An unreasonable
error is any error, regardless of fault, and will entitle the contrac-
tor to judgment on his claim for delay damages.5 2
There is no touchstone for determining when the negligence as
opposed to the strict liability standard will be applied, except that
the courts have shown a greater inclination to apply the latter if
there is evidence of an affirmative misrepresentation or if the con-
tract contains a suspension of work clause.53
49. Id. at 1015.
50. Id. at 1013-14.
51. Id.
52. Carl M. Halvorson, Inc. v. United States, 461 F.2d 1337, 1345 n.1, (Ct. Cl.
1972); J.L. Simmons Company, Inc. v. United States, 412 P.2d 1360, 1383 (Ct. Cl.
1969).
53. Id. U.C.C. § 2-315, providing for the implied warranty of fitness for the par-
ticular purpose, lends support for the exclusive use of the strict liability standard.
That section provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any partic-
ular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is rely-
ing on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,
there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
The implied warranty of fitness for the particular purpose envisages a specific
use which is peculiar to the buyer's needs. U.C.C. § 2-315, comment 2. See Block-
head, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Company, Inc. 402 F. Supp. 1017, 1025 (D. Conn. 1975)
where the court held that because cases manufactured by defendant for plaintiff
distributor were never intended for any purpose other than the ordinary purpose
of carrying hairpieces and accessories, the implied warranty of fitness for the pur-
pose was not applicable to the cases.
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D. Accuracy of the Specifications
The government impliedly warrants the accuracy of its specifi-
cations, and thus, the contractor has the right to rely on them for
the purposes stated therein. These purposes may not necessarily
include the manufacture of a finished product, which differenti-
ates this implied warranty from the others previously discussed.
The reason for the imposition of warranty of accuracy is to pro-
tect the contractor from hazards incident to the competitive bid-
Two requirements must be satisfied before the implied warranty of fitness for
the particular purpose can be invoked: 1) the buyer must rely on the seller's skill
or judgment in selecting or furnishing suitable goods and 2) the seller must have
known or had reason to know, at the time of the sale, of the buyer's peculiar
needs and that the buyer was relying on his skill or judgment. U.C.C. § 2-315, com-
ment 1. See Jetero Construction Company, Inc. v. South Memphis Lumber Com-
pany, Inc., 531 F.2d 1348, 1353-55 (6th Cir. 1976) where it was held that defendant, a
seller of lumber to be used as studs in constructing buildings, breached the im-
plied warranty of fitness for the particular purpose with regard to lumber which
warped, bowed, and discolored after delivery to plaintiff builder. Findings that de-
fendant generally knew of the purpose for which the studs would be used and the
defendant was an experienced lumber dealer and had greater skill and judgment
than plaintiff's representative concerning specifications of various lumber types
and grades and the suitability of such lumber for specific construction projects,
were supported by substantial evidence and were sufficient to establish a breach
of implied warranty.
Once the requirements of U.C.C. § 2-315 have been met, the implied warranty
will be imposed by operation of law on the basis of public policy. The UCC strict
liability standard can be imported into government contract law and can be used
to exclusion of the negligence standard. Federal courts have established the gen-
eral applicability of the UCC to government contracts, and other UCC provisions
have influenced federal decision. See United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d
674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966) where the Court stated:
We find persuasive the defendant's suggestion of looking to the Uniform
Commercial Code as a source for the "federal" law of sales. The Code has
been adopted by Congress for the District of Columbia, has been enacted
in over forty states, and is thus well on its way to becoming a truly na-
tional law of commerce, which . . . is "more complete and more certain,
than any other which can conceivably be drawn from those sources of,
general law, to which we were accustomed to resort in the days of Swift v.
Tyson."
See also Gardiner Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir.
1973) (cites U.C.C. §§ 2-403 & 1-201); In Re King-Porter Company 446 F.2d 722, 726,
732 (5th Cir. 1971) (cites U.C.C. §§ 9-301 & 9-312); Lea Tai Textile Co., Ltd., v. Man-
ning Fabrics, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1404, 1406 (S.D. New York 1975) (cites U.C.C. & 2-
207).
The contractor who accepts and uses government design specifications is in a
position similar to that of a buyer in relation to a seller. The contractor and the
buyer both customarily rely on the superior skill and judgment of the government
and seller, respectively. Therefore, to effectuate uniformity in federal decisions, it
behooves courts to consider using the standards set forth in U.C.C. § 2-315 when-
ever defective government specifications produce delay damages.
ding system. 54 Under the competitive bidding system, the
contractor must submit the low bid in order to be awarded the
contract. Because the bid period is usually of very limited dura-
tion, the contractor's right to rely on the accuracy of the govern-
ment specifications is understandable. 55 He does not have
sufficient time to check for errors in the government specifica-
tions, and this increases the possibility of an inadvertant miscal-
culation in the submission of his bid.56
In Arcole Midwest Corp. v. United States,57 plaintiff contracted
to construct a dam for the government. The specifications stated
that sufficient power lines were already available in the immedi-
ate vicinity. Plaintiff estimated that about 1250 kilowatts were
needed for it to perform the contract, however, the power com-
pany operating near the construction site told plaintiff that the
power plant could generate only 200 kilowatts. Plaintiff then had
to construct a power line of about sixteen miles in length to serve
the construction site. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to
recover its construction costs. The rule is well established that
where the Government makes positive statements in the specifi-
cations or drawings for the guidance of bidders, a contractor has a
right to rely on them regardless of the contractual provisions re-
quiring the contractor to make investigations.58
The contractor's right to rely on the accuracy of government
specifications could indicate that actual reliance need not be
shown.5 9 However, nearly all courts have been reluctant to so
hold. Generally, some degree of reliance must be demonstrated. 60
There is no implied warranty of the accuracy of the specifica-
tions if the contractor waives their accuracy by failing to take ac-
54. See Blount Brothers Construction Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 962, 972-73
(Ct. Cl. 1965).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 113 F. Supp. 278 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
58. Id. at 280.
59. See, e.g., Railroad Waterproofing Corp. v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 713,
716 (Ct. Cl. 1956). There, the contract was for cleaning and resealing joints on the
runways, taxiways, parking and standing areas at an Air Force base. The plaintiff
not only inspected the Air Force base prior to the submission of its bid but, also,
did not rely on the specifications after it began to doubt their accuracy. The plain-
tiff did, however, rely on the lineal footage specified in the Invitation for Bids. On
that basis, the court granted plaintiff relief, stating that "it was not incumbent
upon plaintiff to correct errors in the specifications; it was incumbent upon the
Government to make them reasonably accurate." While it is true that the govern-
ment has a duty to make its specifications accurate, the court departed from the
weight of authority by stating that the contractor has no duty to correct errors in
the specifications. The opposite is true. See notes 83-85 and 88-90, supra.
60. Patten, The Implied Warranty That Attaches to Government Furnished De-
sign Specifications, 31 F.B.J. 291, 294 (1972).
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tion to repudiate or rescind the contract once he becomes
convinced that the specifications are inaccurate.6 1 Also, if the in-
accuracy cannot be attributed to any act or omission by the gov-
ernment, there is no implied warranty.
62
LIMITATIONS ON THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
A. Caveatory Language and Disclaimers
Many government contracts contain caveatory and disclaimer
provisions to shield the government from the implied warranty.
Typically, these provisions call for the contractor to inspect the
work site, satisfy himself of all the conditions, and familiarize
himself with all the information, or they will state that the govern-
ment does not guarantee any of the factual statements in the
specifications. If the caveatory and disclaimer provisions are too
general, they will not vitiate the implied warranty.63 In other
cases, they may be enforced. For example, in Archie and Allen
Spiers, Inc. v. United States,64 plaintiff contracted with the Navy
to repair pipelines on piers located at a Navy supply center. The
specifications were defective and plaintiff was unable to complete
the project in the time allotted. Consequently, plaintiff sued for
the increased direct labor, overhead, and equipment costs attribu-
table to the prolonged period of performance. The Navy defended
by asserting that clauses in the contract warning the contractor
not to rely on the specifications precluded liability. Plaintiff con-
tended that the clauses were legally meaningless and cited
Spearin as support.
Spearin was distinguishable on its facts in that there had been
a misrepresentation of the conditions at the drydock. Before mak-
ing the contract, the government knew that the sewers had peri-
odically overflowed. That fact, however, had not been
communicated to the contractor. In Archie and Allan Spiers, the
evidence did not reveal any misrepresentation. The government
was unaware of any instability in the subsurface areas around the
piers and at all times represented what it believed to be the true
61. United States v. Idlewild Pharmacy, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 19, 22 (F.D. Va. 1969).
62. Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. United States, 473 F.2d 1372, 1374
(7th Cir. 1973).
63. United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 137 (1918). See also United Contrac-
tors v. United States, 368 F.2d 585, 598 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
64. 296 F.2d 757 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
conditions. The court, therefore, upheld the validity of the dis-
claimer clauses. 65
The cases have generally held that if the government makes a
factual misrepresentation on which the contractor can justifiably
rely, the caveatory and disclaimer clauses will be disregarded.
66
The reason for this is that contractors normally are not expected
to conduct work site tests and investigations. This is the govern-
ment's responsibility. If contractors were to perform these duties,
there would be a reduction in the number of bids and a rise in bid
prices, which would hurt the competitive bidding system.
67
Midland Land and Improvement Company v. United States,
68
cited with approval in Archie and Allan Spiers, set forth stand-
ards to sustain a misrepresentation finding:
The burden of proving misrepresentation rests upon the party making the
allegation .... There must be some degree of culpability attached to the
makers of the maps and charts, either that they were knowingly untrue or
were prepared as the result of such a serious and egregious error that the
court may imply bad faith. The many contract cases in this court, too
many to cite, sustain this principle.
6 9
By defining a misrepresentation as a "knowing untruth" or a "se-
rious and egregious" error so as to suggest "bad faith," the impli-
cation is that gross negligence or recklessness is required. This is
not true. A misrepresentation may result from ordinary negli-
gence7 0 and a showing of bad faith is not necessary.
7 1
Because it cited the misrepresentation standards set forth in
Midland Land and Improvement Company, the court in Archie
and Allan Spiers may have erred in concluding that the govern-
ment did not misrepresent the specifications. Since ordinary neg-
ligence is sufficient to sustain a misrepresentation finding, it is
arguable that the government was negligent and misrepresented
the specifications by neglecting to undertake a thorough prelimi-
nary study in order to discover whether the contract could be suc-
cessfully completed through use of the specifications. Other
cases have referred to the government's duty to disclose facts that
it has greater opportunity to discover.7 2 In Archie and Allan
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U.S. 165, 172 (1914); Railroad Wa-
terproofing Corp. v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 713, 716 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
67. See Robert E. McKee, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 414 F. Supp. 957, 959 (N.D.
Ga. 1976).
68. 58 Ct. Cl. 671, 683-84 (1924), affd, 270 U.S. 251 (1925).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Christie v. United States, 237 U.S. 234, 242 (1915).
71. Chris Berg, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.2d 364, 365 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
72. See, e.g., J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. United States, 390 F.2d 886, 888 (Ct.
Cl. 1968) which dealt with problems relating to interagency relationships and the
duty of disclosure. Plaintiff entered into an agreement with the Army, acting as
the construction agency for the Air Force, to build various facilities at Cape Ken-
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Spiers, the government, not the contractor, had a greater opportu-
nity to discover the facts relevant to the performance of the con-
tract because Navy ships were serviced and other Naval activities
were likewise carried out at the piers. Therefore, the disclaimer
clauses should have been invalidated.
Even when misrepresentation is not present, courts have re-
fused to honor disclaimer clauses which do not warn the contrac-
tor of specific problems that could be encountered.7 3 The courts
have interpreted such disclaimer clauses strictly to avoid the
nedy. At the time the agreement was executed, the Air Force knew, but failed to
disclose to the Army or the plaintiff, that a high priority ICBM construction pro-
gram, for which premium wages were going to be paid, was to be initiated in the
same labor area. The labor shortage following the initiation of the ICBM construc-
tion program, which resulted from the use of premium wages and overtime, forced
the plaintiff to absorb increased labor costs in order to obtain the labor necessary
to complete the project on time. The court held that the Air Force breached a duty
to disclose these facts to the Army and to the plaintiff and should be liable for the
plaintiff's increased labor costs.
In non-disclosure cases, the contractor may also avoid the contract if it would
be unfair for him to continue working on it. A balancing test is used to determine
unfairness. Factors balanced include the character of the information to which the
contractor was privy, its relationship to the contract, the government's conduct in
making information available or withholding it, and the reasonableness of the con-
tractor's reliance on the information made available. In J.A. Jones Construction
Co. v. United States, 390 F.2d 886, 890 (Ct. Cl. 1968), the court stated:
As we have pointed out, this record shows each prerequisite to liability
(a) The Air Force's personnel knew of the other construction and its prob-
able consequences at the time plaintiff's contract was awarded; (b) plain-
tiff neither knew nor should have known those facts; and (c) the Air Force
was or should have been aware of plaintiff's ignorance but nevertheless
failed to disclose the pertinent information.
Avoidance will invariably be denied if the contractor had access to the correct
information, which was the situation in Aerojet General Corp. v. United States, 467
F.2d 1293, 1298 (Ct. Cl. 1972). There, Aerojet purchased shipyards from contractors
who were using them under prior agreements with the government. Before the
purchase had been finalized, Aerojet sent several of its employees to the ship-
yards to inquire about the status of the prior agreements. Aerojet was told that
they were about one-half completed and that no losses were anticipated. This in-
formation was incorrect. Nevertheless, the court held that the government's duty
was merely a duty not to be negligent in ascertaining the information before mak-
ing the representation.
The absence of intent to defraud and the inadvertant withholding of information
are other grounds on which the government has successfully relied to resist
avoidance of the contract. H.N. Baily and Associates v. United States, 449 F.2d
376, 382-83 (Ct. Cl. 1971). LaCrosse Garment Mfg. Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d
1377, 1381 (Ct. Cl. 1970). However, the better view is that the good faith element of
the government's representation is immaterial. Everett Plywood and Door Corp.
v. United States, 419 F.2d 425, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
73. Thompson Ramo Woolridge, Inc. v. United States, 361 F.2d 222, 231-33 (Ct.
C1. 1969).
harsh effect intended by the government. 74 The essence of this
procedure is to promote basic fairness. In this connection, dis-
claimer clauses have also been struck down when an insufficient
amount of time has been given to the contractor to make a site
inspection75 or when such an inspection is impossible or impracti-
cal. 76
Clear and fair disclaimers of government liability, however, will
override the implied warranty. This was the case in Flippin
Materials Co. v. United States,77 where the contract contained the
following elaborate provisions on site inspections and representa-
tions:
The contractor acknowledges that he has satisfied himself as to the nature
and location of the work, the general and local conditions, particularly
those bearing upon transportation, disposal, handling and storage of
materials, availability of labor, water, electric power, any roads, uncertain-
ties of weather, river stages, tides or similar physical conditions at the
site, the conformation and condition of the ground, the character, quality
and quantity of surface and subsurface materials to be encountered, the
character and equipment and facilities needed preliminary to and during
the prosecution of the work and all other matters which can in any way
affect the work or the cost thereof under this contract. Any failure by the
contractor to acquaint himself with all the available information concern-
ing these conditions will not relieve him from responsibility for estimating
properly the difficulty or cost of successfully performing the work. The
Government assumes no responsibility for any understanding or repre-
sentations made by any of its officers or agents during or prior to the ne-
gotiation and execution of this contract, unless (1) such understanding or
representations are expressly stated in the contract and (2) the contract
expressly provides that responsibility therefor is assumed by the Govern-
ment. Representation made but not so expressly assumed by the Govern-
ment in the contract shall be deemed only for the information of the
contractor and the Government will not be liable or responsible there-
for.7
8
Apparently, decisions on disclaimers may also turn on whether
the contractor has been put on notice of the wisdom of including
a price contingency in his bid price.79
B. Unjustifiable Reliance on the Specifications: The "Knew or
Should Have Known" Defense
1. Where the Contract Directs the Contractor to Other
Information
In Flippin Materials, plaintiff entered into a contract with the
government to excavate a rock from a government owned moun-
74. Id.
75. Fehlhaber Corp. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 817, 825 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
76. Morrison-Knudsen Company v. United States, 345 F.2d 535, 539 (Ct. Cl.
1965).
77. 312 F.2d 408 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
78. Id. at 415 n.11.
79. Id. at 408.
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tain. Part of the mountain consisted of clay-contaminated rock,
which rendered plaintiffs job more difficult. The government
specifications did not show that the cavities in the mountain were
clay-filled, but the contract contained provisions directing plaintiff
to government information relating to soil conditions, including
government test borings and field logs. The issue was whether
plaintiff's reliance on the government specifications was justified.
The court held that since the government information was readily
available to plaintiff, plaintiff could not recover additional costs
for the removal of the clay-contaminated rock.80
The general rule is that a contractor cannot justifiably rely on
government specifications unless he scrutinizes other government
materials referred to in the contract.8 1 The rationale for this rule
is twofold. First, the other government materials may qualify, ex-
pand, or explain the government specifications. If such is the
case, a contractor cannot honestly allege that he has been misled
unless he has had access to all the relevant information.8 2 Sec-
ond, it is the court's policy to look at the entire contract when in-
terpreting the contractual duties. 83
2. Obvious Errors and Discrepancies
In Allied Contractors, Inc. v. United States,84 plaintiff entered
into a contract with the Army to construct a missile facility. Dur-
ing construction, two walls collapsed due to water pressure ex-
erted behind them. After rebuilding the walls, plaintiff sued the
government for breach of the implied warranty of the adequacy of
the specifications. The court denied plaintiff's claim, stating that
the defects of which plaintiff complained were so obvious that
plaintiff either knew or should have known of them. 85 Thus, a
contractor who knows or should have known of an obvious gov-
ernment error must call it to the government's attention so that
80. Id. at 413.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. For other cases denying recovery to contractors for ignoring directions
to examine other sources of information, see Puget Sound Bridge and Dredging
Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 368 (Ct. Cl. 1955); C.W. Blakeslee and Sons, Inc.
v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 226, cert. denied, 309 U.S. 659 (1939). See also Central
Dredging Company, Inc. v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 1 (1941); Trimount Dredging
Co. v. United States, 80 Ct. Cl. 559 (1935).
84. 381 F.2d 995 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
85. Id. at 999.
proper steps may be taken to rectify the mistake.86
The duty to detect obvious errors, and communicate these dis-
coveries to the government does not apply to situations where the
contractor is under no contractual obligation to examine the spec-
ifications. 87 No contractual obligation arises when a contractor
looks at the specifications merely for the purpose of computing
his bid.88
Additionally, the contractor's prospects for compensation on the
implied warranty theory will not be favorable if a glaring discrep-
ancy exists in the specifications. A duty is imposed on the con-
tractor to seek a clarification of such a discrepancy. In Wickham
Contracting Co., Inc. v. United States,89 plaintiff contracted with
the government to build an underground electrical cable. The
specifications contained two different scales. One scale provided
that 1'=200', whereas the other provided that 1"=200'. Plaintiff
based its bid on the erroneous 1'=200' scale. The issue was
whether plaintiff was entitled to recover extra expenses for using
the erroneous scale, which caused it to under-bid. The court, cit-
ing Allied Contractors with approval, stated that plaintiff's failure
to act on the glaring discrepancy barred recovery.90
Other courts have applied this rule in different contexts. For
example, it held that a contractor will be bound by the govern-
ment's interpretation of the contract requirements if he fails to
advise the government of an alleged conflict in the specifica-
tions.9 1
3. Actual Knowledge of Defects
Generally, actual knowledge of defects in government specifica-
tions will be fatal to the implied warranty claim if the contractor
does not notify the government or state any exceptions in his
bid.92 However, the contractor's actual knowledge may not fore-
close relief if the government and the contractor are mutually at
fault. In cases of mutual fault, the courts have the power to split
the losses between the parties. In Dynalectron Corporation v.
United States,93 the controversy arose when the government ter-
86. Id.
87. Thompson Ramo Woolridge, Inc. v. United States, 361 F.2d 222, 231-33 (Ct.
C1. 1966).
88. Id.
89. 546 F.2d 395 (Ct. C1. 1976).
90. Id. at 398.
91. See, e.g., H.L.C. Associates Construction Co., Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d
586, 598 (Ct. C1. 1966).
92. Anthony M. Meyerstein, Inc. v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 427, 430-31 (Ct.
Cl. 1956).
93. 518 F.2d 594 (Ct. C1. 1975).
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minated a contract due to plaintiff's inability to comply with spec-
ifications calling for the production of an airplane antenna
system. Prior to bidding, plaintiff knew that the specifications
were defective and that considerable difficulties would ensue if it
attempted to use them. However, despite this knowledge, plaintiff
did not tell the government of its suspicion but decided to per-
form the contract, apparently assuming that the defects could be
corrected in a manner that would be acceptable to the govern-
ment. Unable to overcome the specification defects, plaintiff was
late in making delivery and the government terminated the con-
tract for default. The government itself was not blameless. It con-
tributed to the errors that were made and exploited plaintiff's
problems by learning what would not work at plaintifrs expense.
Citing National Presto Industries, Inc. v. United States,94 the court
94. In that controversial case, the losses were split between the parties on the
ground of mutual mistake. Subsequent decisions have limited the case to its pecu-
liar facts. See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. United States, 475 F.2d 1168, 1174-76 (Ct.
Cl. 1973).
The mutual mistake cases have created problems in the application of govern-
ment contract law. Instances where relief has been granted indicate that the con-
tractor has had to prove that both he and the government acted under the
misapprehension of some fact. This proof is easily obtained if the mistake is
found in the contractual documents, such as the bidding papers. Otherwise, the
contractor must use parol evidence concerning their discussions and negotiations
in order to prove that the mistake was mutual. This is a very difficult task in that
discussions and negotiations involving a specific mistaken fact are usually non-ex-
istent. More often, discussions and negotiations show only a general recognition
by the government and the contractor that some production techniques are supe-
rior to others. Except for National Presto, the rule is that unforseeability as to
performance difficulties resulting from defective production techniques does not
qualify as a mutual mistake. In McNamara Construction of Manitoba, Ltd. v.
United States, 509 F.2d 1166, 1167-68 (Ct. Cl. 1975) the court stated:
Plaintiffs claim must fail. There was, simply, no mutual mistake of fact by
the parties of the type for which judicial relief may be given. Both parties,
at the time of executing the contract, were fully aware of the potential for
labor difficulties .... What we have in the instant case, therefore, is a
risk which is known to both parties and results from human inability to
predict the future. The authorities are unanimous in distinguishing such
risks from bonafide mutual mistakes of fact.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 502, comment F. supports this distinc-r
tion:
Where the parties know that there is doubt in regard to a certain matter
and contract on that assumption, the contract is not rendered voidable be-
cause one is disappointed in the hope that the facts accord with his
wishes. The risk of the existence of the doubtful fact is then assumed as
one of the elements of the bargain.
Similar statements are made in 3 CORBIN, CONTRACT § 598 (2d ed. 1960) at 585-86
and WUSTON, CONTRACTS § 1543 (3d ed. 1970) at 75.
It therefore seems that for a contractor to obtain relief on the theory of mutual
decided that the equitable solution would be for the parties to
split the losses. 95
Dynalectron Corporation stands for several propositions. Once
the contractor determines that performance under the specifica-
tions is impracticable, he has the duty to so inform the govern-
ment. Also, the government cannot compel the contractor to do
what is impossible. Finally, if both the government and the con-
tractor are mutually at fault, the losses will be split.
96
4. Follow-On Contracts
Follow-on contracts are a series of contracts, each part of a
scheme to satisfy on-going government requirements. A follow-on
contractor is not entitled to relief if he enters into a second con-
tract with knowledge that the specifications were inadequate
under prior contract. This rule, 97 stated in Helene Curtis, is analo-
gous to the defense that a defendant may assert in a suit for mis-
representation, namely, that plaintiff's reliance on the challenged
representation was unjustified.98
In L. W. Foster Sportswear, the court refused to apply this rule
after making the observation that the contractor reasonably relied
on the government's practice of granting waivers to known de-
fects in the specifications. Such waivers had been granted in five
prior contracts. These facts, however, were dissimilar to the facts
in Helene Curtis and R.E.D.M. Corporations, where the govern-
ment had a waiver policy and where the contractors knew that de-
fective specifications had been used under previous contracts.99
mistake the traditional guidelines will have to be met or the contractor's case
must be directly on point with National Presto, namely: 1) a joint enterprise, ex-
perimental undertaking in which neither the contractor nor the government as-
sume the risk, 2) great concern by the government with regard to the undertaking,
and 3) a benefit flowing to the government from the contractor's protracted period
of trial and error.
95. 518 F.2d at 604.
96. See also Grumman Aerospace Corporation v. United States, 549 F.2d 767,
774-75 (Ct. Cl. 1977). There, the contractor sought reimbursement for amounts
paid to a subcontractor, who was guilty of overpricing. The court permitted con-
tractor to recover from the government one-half of the amounts paid because the
government did not maintain close surveillance over the subcontract pricing and
because purchase order memoranda indicated that the contractor had exercised
reasonable business judgment in allowing the subcontract.
97. See also Firestone Tire and Rubber Company v. United States, 558 F.2d
577, 590 (Ct. Cl. 1977) where it was held that the contractor was not entitled to re-
cover extra costs caused by drilling problems when at the time the contract was
executed, the contractor was completely aware of those problems by virtue of its
subcontracting activities for other contractors participating in the project; Accord,
Wickham Contracting Co., Inc. v. United States, 546 F.2d 395, 400 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
98. LW. Foster Sportswear Co., Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1285, 1290 (Ct.
Cl. 1969).
99. 312 F.2d at 779 and 428 F.2d at 1308.
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A contractor cannot safely compete for a follow-on contract with
defective specifications. He should contact the procurement
agency and suggest the postponement of the procurement until
the defects have been corrected. If the procurement agency pro-
ceeds with the procurement, the contractor should refrain from
bidding on the contract.
5. Insufficient Detail in the Specifications
In National Presto Industries, Inc. v. United States,lOO the gov-
ernment and the contractor entered into an agreement for the
production of artillery shells by the use of a new hot cup cold
draw method. To facilitate production, the contractor asked the
government to add plunge grinders and turning devices to the
equipment to be supplied. The government replied that it did not
want these items to be used and omitted them from the final
agreement. After the contractor experienced production difficul-
ties, it sued the government for breach of the implied warranty.
The court stated:
In these circumstances we cannot find any warranty or representation by
the Government, express or implied, as to plunge grinders or turning
equipment. Before the contract was made, the plaintiff understood that
the defendant, for better or worse, would not then countenance the acqui-
sition of these items. Nevertheless the plaintiff went ahead to complete
and execute the bargain. The situation was not materially different from
pre-contract negotiations in which the participants haggle over equipment
to be financed or furnished by the Government for a new procurement. In
the absences of overriding special knowledge on the part of the defendant,
or some explicit clause later inserted in the contract, the defendant's re-
fusal to agree to plaintiff's introductory request is not a warranty or a rep-
resentation that the contract can be effectively performed on the
Government's terms, any more than the defendant's insistence in negotia-
tion on a certain price is a warranty or representation that the contractor
will be able to make a profit at that price.10 1
National Presto illustrates several problems confronting a con-
tractor who attempts to invoke the implied warranty. If the
specifications are vague or incomplete, the implied warranty may
not be a viable theory. The contractor's solution might be to sug-
gest a method of production needed to perform the contract, al-
though he then may have assumed the risk for any defect in the
specifications. The fact that the government agrees to accept the
contractor's suggested method of production is not an implied
warranty that no other method of production is needed.
100. 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
101. Id. at 105.
C. Contractor Participation in Specification Preparation
The contractor may jeopardize the implied warranty by propos-
ing additions or substitutions to government specifications. In
Austin Company v. United States,102 plaintiff entered into an
agreement with the government to develop a new digital data and
recording system. Prior to the execution of the agreement, plain-
tiff reviewed the government specifications and announced that
they would not produce a workable system. Plaintiff then pro-
posed substitute specifications, which the government accepted.
When the specifications proposed by plaintiff also turned out to
be defective, the court held plaintiff was not entitled to recover
extra costs.
03
Hence, if the government drafts the specifications an implied
warranty in favor of the contractor is created.104 The converse is
also true: if the contractor drafts the specifications and the gov-
ernment incorporates them into the contract, the government is
entitled to rely on the specifications and the contractor is not enti-
tled to relief if the specifications are defective. 05 This rule oper-
ates to prevent the contractor from gambling on a contract
involving a new product and forcing the government to pay the
expense for an unsuccessful gamble.106
In Austin there was no attempt by the contractor to resist dam-
ages, which were not sought by the government in that case. The
inference is that if the contractor drafts defective specifications,
the government has a cause of action and may assert it by way of
suit or counterclaim. 07
In order for the contractor's implied warranty to be negated, his
authorship of the specifications must, of course, be proven. In
this regard, courts look not to the form of the specification but
rather to its substance. The critical issue is not which party actu-
ally wrote the specification but rather which party established its
requirements.10 8
When definitive government specifications are unavailable, the
usual method of formal advertising is abandoned and the two-step
formal advertising procedure is utilized. 109 The first step requires
the government to inform the contractors of its general require-
102. 314 F.2d 518 (Ct. C1. 1963).
103. Id. at 520.
104. United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 135 (1918).
105. 314 F.2d at 520.
106. United States v. Wegematic Corporation, 360 F.2d 674, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1966).
107. 314 F.2d at 520.
108. See Bruner, Impossibility of Performance in the Law of Government
Contracts, 9 AF JAG L. Rev. 6 (1967).
109. See ASPR §§ 2-501 to 2-503 (January 1, 1969).
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ments and then evaluates the technical proposals submitted to
determine whether minimum requirements have been met. All
acceptable technical proposals then qualify for the second step,
which follows the usual method of formal advertising. This proce-
dure is similar to the events that happened in Austin, except for
the fact that in two-step formal advertising the contractor must
submit a technical proposal to be considered for the award of the
contract. In Austin the contractor voluntarily submitted a techni-
cal proposal. This factual difference should not change the hold-
ing in Austin as applied to two-step formal advertising. When the
contractor submits a technical proposal, voluntarily or
mandatorily he vouches for its adequacy.110
The government may place its trust on the contractor's superior
technical knowledge in preparing the specifications. If this is the
case, there may be no implied warranty. In Bethlehem Corpora-
tion v. United States,"' a case that lies between the opposite ex-
tremes of Hol-Gar and Austin, plaintiff entered into an agreement
with the Army to manufacture and install an environmental test
chamber. The Army asked plaintiff, an expert manufacturer in
this field, if such a chamber could be made with the relative hu-
midity ranging from 10% to 95% over a temperature range of
-100°F to +100 0 F. When plaintiff told the Army that these re-
quirements could be satisfied, the Army prepared specifications
in reliance on the representations made by plaintiff. Subse-
quently, plaintiff learned that the chamber requirements were im-
possible to meet and sought relief, citing Hol-Gar to bolster its
arguments. Hol-Gar, however, was not on point. Unlike the con-
tract in Bethlehem, the contract in Hol-Gar contained a special
provision committing the government to pay extra costs in the
event that tests showed that the specifications were inadequate
and would have to be changed. 112
The court stated the contract in Bethlehem more closely resem-
bled the contract in Austin and held that plaintiff assumed the
110. See, Dygert, Implied Warranties in Government Contracts, 53 MIL. L. REV.
39, 43 (1971).
111. 462 F.2d 1400 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
112. Id. at 1404. See also Foster Wheeler Corporation v. United States, 513 F.2d
588, 598-99 (Ct. Cl. 1975), where the government assumed the risk of impossibility
of performance because the government's expertise surpassed the contractor's in
connection with the use of testing procedures necessary to produce hardened boil-
ers and also because the Invitation for Bids included extremely detailed
specifications.
risk of impossibility of performance because it gave expert advice
to the Army:
Admittedly, unlike the facts in Austin, here Bethlehem did not itself pre-
pare the specifications, although its Technical Proposal was made a part of
the contract. However, prior to bidding, Bethlehem assured the Govern-
ment's representative that the specifications were reasonable and attaina-
ble. Bethlehem was aware that it was being consulted as a leading expert
in environmental chamber manufacture and that the Government's pro-
ject engineer was not an expert in that area. On the record before it, the
Board correctly found there was no showing that the Laboratory, or the
purchasing office, or any other Government activity involved in preparing
the specifications, knew anything about the technical difficulties Bethle-
hem might experience or had knowledge equal to or superior to that pos-
sessed by Bethlehem. 1 13
It is possible for the contractor to prevent the forfeiture of the
implied warranty even if expert advice is offered to the govern-
ment in drafting the specifications.1 4 The contractor's expertise
can be offset by the equivalent expertise of government officials
within the contracting agency.n1 5 However, unless there is an in-
ter-agency relationship,1 6 the expertise of government officials
from different agencies will not be imputed to government offi-
cials within the contracting agency." 7
D. The Commercial Impracticability Hurdle
When it directs the method of manufacture, the government
does not impliedly warrant that its method can be pursued with-
out difficulty. It impliedly warrants only that performance is pos-
sible within the state of the art.118 A severe limitation on the
implied warranty of the adequacy of the method of manufacture
is that the contractor has the burden of proving that the govern-
ment's method is commercially impracticable." 9 Commercial im-
practicability means that performance can be achieved only at
exorbitant costs. 120 Thus, if the gist of the contractor's complaint
is that the government's method is uneconomical, the contractor
has not stated a cause of action.' 2 '
It is not enough for the contractor to convey to the government
113. 462 F.2d at 1404.
114. But cf, J.A. Maurer, Inc. v. United States, 485 F.2d 588, 594-95 (Ct. C1. 1973)
where the court held in the government's favor for the reason that the contractor
had assured the government that it had the special expertise to perform a very
experimental task which it knew had never been performed.
115. 462 F.2d at 1404.
116. See L.W. Foster Sportswear Co., Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1285, 1291
(Ct. Cl. 1969).
117. 462 F.2d at 1404.
118. Natus Corporation v. United States, 371 F.2d 450, 458 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
119. Id. at 458.
120. Id. at 456.
121. Id. at 457.
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its opinions regarding commercial impracticability, even though
the contractor has overwhelming evidence to support those opin-
ions. The contractor must make some effort to perform the con-
tract under the specifications as a prerequisite to claiming
commercial impracticability.122 One advantage the contractor has
is that if the specifications are ambiguous and the contractor's in-
terpretation differs from the government's, the contractor's inter-
pretation, if reasonable, will prevail under the contra preferentum
rule.123
The contractor can enhance his chances of recovery on the im-
plied warranty of the adequacy of method theory if he alleges
commercial impracticability and mutual mistake. In R.M. Hol-
lingshead Corporation v. United States,124 the contract required
plaintiff to supply the government with a substantial quantity of
DDT concentrate in metal drums. The contract stated that the
concentrate should not become filmy or otherwise deteriorate
while stored for a one year period. After one-fifth of the concen-
trate had been delivered, an inspection indicated that it was be-
ginning to lose its clear color. At the time the contract was
executed, the concentrate was a new and untested product so that
neither the government nor plaintiff knew that it could not be
stored in metal drums for a long period of time without an accom-
panying loss in clearness. That lack of knowledge was the mutual
mistake. Plaintiff sued for the contract price of the concentrate
that had been delivered. The court held for plaintiff, stating that
the parties under a mutual mistake entered into a commercially
impracticable contract, and that plaintiff should not have to shoul-
der the entire loss. 125
E. Where Alternative Methods of Performance Are Permitted
Some types of government specifications afford the contractor
greater flexibility in performing the contract by permitting alter-
native methods of performance. However, if too much discretion
is left to the contractor, these specifications will begin to take on
characteristics of performance specifications126 thus weakening
122. Koppers Company, Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 554, 565 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
123. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation v. United States, 419 F.2d 439, 459
n.21 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
124. 111 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
125. Id. at 286.
126. See note 22, supra.
the contractor's claim for additional compensation.127 The courts
have been erratic in deciding when to give relief to the contractor
who performs the contract using these types of specifications.
The result appears to depend upon a determination of which
party has assumed the risk of non-performance. 28
Where the specification requires the contractor to furnish a
"brand name" or "equal product," the normal implied warranty
rule governs. The government impliedly warrants that the "brand
name" or the "equal product" are both available in the market-
place and that if either is used, the contract can be performed
without undue difficulty. This point was made clear in Aerodex,
Inc. v. United States,129 where the court stated:
[W Ihere the Government issues an invitation for a procurement item con-
taining a component which is given a purchase description consisting of a
brand name product manufactured by a designated company or its "ap-
proved substantial equal". . . it is the obligation of the Government to as-
certain and assure the bidders the commercial availability of the
component from its manufacturer before it employs it as a purchase
description or, failing that, to provide bidders with a sufficient description
of the physical specifications and performance characteristics so that it
may be duplicated by the bidders either by in-house fabrication or by
purchase from suppliers.130
Other than the "brand name" or "equal product" specification
description, the specification may state that the contractor has the
option of selecting any of the production methods listed. If the
contractor makes a bad choice, finding out later that performance
is being hampered by the defective method, the contractor should
be able to obtain compensation.13 However, if the contractor ig-
nores advisory methods and uses his own techniques, he may
have assumed the risk that his own techniques would not yield a
satisfactory result. In Gulf Western Precision Engineering Co. v.
United States, 32 plaintiff entered into an agreement with the gov-
ernment to manufacture guided missile warheads. There were
both mandatory and advisory design specifications which were
subsequently found to be defective. Plaintiff followed the
mandatory design specifications but not the advisory ones.
Rather, plaintiff used a less costly technique of its own to manu-
facture the initial set of warheads. These were rejected by the
government as unsuitable. Plaintiff then performed the contract
in accordance with the more costly advisory design specifications,
but the second set of warheads also were unsuitable. Plaintiff
127. Id.
128. Gulf Western Precision Engineering Co. v. United States, 543 F.2d 125, 131
(Ct. Cl. 1976); Aerodex, Inc. v. United States, 417 F.2d 1361, 1367 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
129. 417 F.2d (Ct. Cl. 1969).
130. Id. at 1366.
131. Id.
132. 543 F.2d 125 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
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urged the court to award it damages covering the costs connected
with the manufacture of the initial set of warheads and also in
performing the contract using the more costly advisory design
specifications. The court denied each of plaintiff's claims, despite
the defectiveness of both the mandatory and advisory design
specifications, stating the plaintiff's rejection of the advisory de-
sign specifications meant that it assumed the risk of non-perform-
ance as to the initial set of warheads.133 As to the post-change
additional costs, the court stated that since the government re-
laxed ballistics standards after acknowledging that they could not
be met by the specifications, plaintiff's decision to use the adviso-
ries at the time meant only that plaintiff was shifting to the gov-
ernment the risk that the warheads would not adequately
perform even under the relaxed ballistics standards. 3 4 In return,
plaintiff accepted responsibility for the additional costs. 1 35
The decision in Gulf Western is perplexing. The rationale of
Hol-Gar should have been controlling. In that case, it was held
that where a change is required due to defective government
specifications, the contractor is entitled to recover additional
costs. 136 The fact that some of the specifications in Gulf Western
were disregarded, whereas in Hol-Gar they were explicitly
followed is an immaterial distinction. In Gulf Western the gov-
ernment knew, almost from the inception, that its specifications
were defective. Yet it did not make any corrections. Therefore,
when plaintiff substituted its own technique, it only assumed that
risk that it would not be able to perform the specifications possi-
ble of performance.1 37
CONCLUSION
The implied warranty is a useful legal tool to gain additional
compensation for attempting to comply with defective govern-
ment design specifications. Thus, contractors dealing with the
government should take every precaution to preserve the implied
warranty. The following steps may help contractors identify and
avoid some of the implied warranty problems frequently encoun-
tered.
133. Id. at 131.
134. Id. at 132.
135. Id. at 132-33.
136. See notes 23 & 24, supra.
137. See dissenting opinion 543 F.2d at 133-34.
1. If the government insists on inserting caveatory or dis-
claimer provisions in the contract, make certain that such lan-
guage is general.138
2. If the caveatory or disclaimer provisions are specific, check
to discover whether a misrepresentation has been made. It will
neutralize the specific provisions.139
3. For hybrid design and performance specifications, avoid ac-
cepting complete discretion in the selection of the method of per-
forming the contract, unless the government expressly agrees to
assume the risk for failure to attain performance goals.'
40
4. Obtain the government's agreement on terms to assume the
risk whenever it incorporates contractor drafted specifications
into the contract.'41
5. If offering expert advice on specification preparation, forfei-
ture of the implied warranty can be prevented by requesting that
government experts participate. 42
6. Do not volunteer specifications to replace defective govern-
ment specifications except on the condition that the government
accepts responsibility for the substituted specifications.143
7. Before beginning work on the contract, analyze the specifi-
cations and decide which method will yield the greatest effi-
ciency.'4
8. Make inquiries into whether any specific problems might re-
sult from using the specifications. 45
9. Examine the specifications to determine whether there are
obvious errors or discrepancies, or if they refer to outside sources
of information. 46
10. Point out ambiguities and omissions to the government. 47
138. United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 137 (1918).
139. See notes 65 to 70, supra.
140. Penguin Industries, Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 934, 937 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
Hal-Gar Manufacturing Corporation v. United States, 360 F.2d 634, 638 (Ct. Cl.
1966); John Thomson Press and Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 200,
209 (1922).
141. United States v. Wegematic Corporation, 360 F.2d 674, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1966);
Austin Company v. United States, 314 F.2d 518, 520 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
142. Foster Wheeler Corporation v. United States, 513 F.2d 588, 598-99 (Ct. Cl.
1975); J.A. Maurer, Inc. v. United States, 485 F.2d 588, 594-95 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Bethle-
hem Corporation v. United States, 462 F.2d 1400, 1404 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
143. Id.
144. United States v. Howard P. Foley Co., Inc., 329 U.S. 64, 68 (1946).
145. Thompson Ramo Woolridge, Inc. v. United States, 361 F.2d 222, 231-33 (Ct.
Cl. 1969); Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc. v. United States, 397 F.2d 826, 852 (Ct.
Cl. 1968).
146. See notes 78 to 90, supra.
147. Michigan Wisconsin Company v. Williams-McWilliams Company, 551 F.2d
945, 951 (5th Cir. 1977); Penguin Industries, Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 934, 937
[Vol. 6: 407, 19791 Federal Government Design Specifications
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
11. Inform the government of suspected errors.148
12. Once a defect becomes known, immediately ask the gov-
ernment to correct it. 149
13. In bidding on a follow-on contract with specifications iden-
tical to the defective specifications used on the prior contract,
contact the procurement agency and suggest postponement of the
procurement until the defects have been remedied. 5 0
14. For specifications permitting alternative methods of per-
formance, do not deviate from the authorized alternatives.'51
15. If the contract includes mandatory and advisory specifica-
tions, use the advisory specifications from the beginning. 5 2
16. Be circumspect about using specifications that appear eco-
nomically impracticable to use.153
17. Whenever a performance problem is recognized, request
that the government split the losses. 54
18. If the specifications have been waived, obtain a written
agreement that the waiver is absolute, complete, and represents
the established policy of the procurement agency.155
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(Ct. Cl. 1976); National Presto Industries, Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, 105 (Ct.
Cl. 1964).
148. Dynalectron Corporation v. United States, 518 F.2d 594, 604 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
149. United States v. Idlewild Pharmacy, Inc. 308 F. Supp. 19, 22 (E.D. Va. 1969);
Allied Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.2d 995, 999 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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151. Gulf Western Precision Engineering Co. v. United States, 543 F.2d 125, 131-
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154. Dynalectron Corporation v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, 112 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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